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FRENCH UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES SPEED UNDERSTANDING WITH U. S.

GENERAL DE GAULLE's visit to Washington, following close upon the Allied capture of the port of Cherbourg, indicates the rapidity with which events have moved under the impact of military operations. The initial Allied successes in the field have not only established a base for further operations in France, but also tend to resolve the crisis in Franco-Allied relations produced at the outset of the invasion when de Gaulle refused to allow previously designated French liaison officers to accompany the first invading forces. Now, however, London reports of June 30 indicate that the British have reached a draft accord with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation on currency control and the administration of civil affairs in France—matters which are doubtless the center of current discussions in Washington.

RECOGNITION OF UNDERGROUND. This improvement of the French political situation has been due as much to the effective role of the resistance forces within France during the first month of the invasion as to any other single factor. General Eisenhower's headquarters has testified that the many recent acts of sabotage throughout France "contributed directly to the Allied success," although it is yet too early to determine the degree of coordinated effort they represent. On June 25 Supreme Headquarters announced the appointment of General Joseph-Pierre Koenig, hero of the battle of Bir Hacheim, as Commander of the French Forces of the Interior, acting directly under General Eisenhower.

In effect this arrangement gives a new status to the underground movement, which is now represented on the Allied staff by an officer close to de Gaulle. The General and his aides were warmly welcomed during their visit to the Normandy beach-head, but a complete picture of the resistance forces will be available only when the armies of liberation have moved further into France. The underground

movement is probably more complex than either the pro- or anti-de Gaullists would admit. There is both individual and group resistance, organized along both social and national lines. Reports of sabotage in factories and on the railways suggest the combined action of workers who are known to have organized through the framework of the former labor unions—the *Confédération Générale du Travail* and the Catholic union, *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*.

The most outstanding activity has been that of the "Maquis" and, in the past month, the Germans have found it necessary to use tanks, artillery and aircraft against them in their stronghold in the Haute Savoie region and in south-central France east of Bordeaux. In and near the key city of Lyon, the "Maquis" seriously hampered the Germans in their attempt to use the Rhone valley transport system to move troops and material into the Normandy sector. Similar activity in the Paris environs is credited with further delaying German defenses in the territory between the Seine and Loire rivers, so crucial to the further expansion of Allied forces from Cherbourg and Caen. On June 28 the Patriots made their most dramatic move by assassinating the Vichy Minister of Information and Propaganda, Philippe Henriot. Official French sources in London admit the German claim that this daring act was perpetrated under the direction of the Forces of the Interior.

EFFECT ON GERMAN DEFENSES. Aside from the immediate aid given to the Allied armies, the underground will also prove important in its continued attacks on German supply lines. The Allies, having secured a sector of the European continent, are fighting with what are virtually interior lines of supply—from Britain. The Nazi armies will from this point forward experience the difficulties inherent in extended lines of communications. The French Forces of the Interior can be most effective in harass-

ing the Germans in their exposed positions, for supply routes, bridges and canals which are not actually attacked must be guarded. As General Koenig organizes and equips the resistance forces, they will aid the invasion troops in making the defensive position of the Nazi armies in France increasingly untenable.

With the second front a reality, and the re-opening of the Russian offensive, the Wehrmacht is more sorely pressed for manpower than at any period during the war. For the first time, the Germans will be unable to release men for the coming harvest either in Germany or in those parts of Europe that may still be occupied by autumn. The year-long

strategic bombings have also presented the Germans with problems beyond their control. The very notable decline in strength of the Luftwaffe may be directly attributed to the air attacks on the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the synthetic gasoline industry in the Reich. Fear of further Allied landings, of course, immobilizes troops for the full length of the Atlantic coast. All of these factors, but in particular the hazardous supply situation now that active military operations are under way in France, may necessitate large-scale German withdrawals once the Allies can expand to the Seine and Loire rivers in their eastward push.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM SHOWS CONTRADICTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

In the platform adopted in Chicago on June 27, the Republican party recognizes that American voters are intent not only on winning this war but also on preventing the recurrence of similar wars in the future. As foreshadowed by the Mackinac resolution of September 7, 1943, the party comes out in favor of "responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." It rejects the concept of a world state, and makes no reference to an international police force. Instead the platform states that the organization it envisages should "develop effective cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repel military aggression." While the phrase "peace forces" was regarded by some members of the resolution's committee as ambiguous, it is said to have been suggested by Senator Austin in whose native Vermont this phrase is used to describe the police force, and could presumably be so interpreted—although spokesmen for the *Chicago Tribune* point of view might think otherwise. The Republican platform also acknowledges "that peace and security do not depend upon the sanction of force alone, but should prevail by virtue of reciprocal interests and spiritual values," and declares that it shall seek "in our relations with other nations, conditions calculated to promote world-wide economic stability."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S VIEWS. The general wording of the Republican platform on these points does not differ fundamentally from the statement issued by President Roosevelt on June 15, in which he said that the purpose of the international organization he had in mind "would be to maintain peace and security and to assist the creation, through international cooperation, of conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations." Like the Republicans, the President rejected the idea of a world state. "We are not thinking," he declared, "of a superstate with its

own police forces and other paraphernalia of coercive power. We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war, and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary." The Republican platform and the President's statement may be said to represent the furthest limits to which, in the judgment of political leaders of both parties, the American people would be prepared at this time to go in collaborating with other nations. The real test of both declarations will, of course, be the concrete measures the two parties are prepared to sponsor in order to implement their pledges.

CLAUSE ON TARIFFS DISTURBING. The Republican platform, outwardly at least, appears to accept the view that the United States can no longer hope to play a lone hand in world affairs, and in its own self-interest must find ways and means of working with other nations in the common tasks of post-war reconstruction. Yet several points in the platform—admittedly, as usual, a compromise between divergent views—make one wonder whether its framers realized the implications of the promises they drafted. If the Republican party intends "to promote world-wide economic stability," should it not wholeheartedly support the reciprocal trade agreements, the one concrete if modest measure this country took in that direction during the inter-war years? Yet the platform says that henceforth tariffs "should be modified only by reciprocal bilateral trade agreements approved by Congress." This is a double-barreled threat to the reciprocal trade program. First, the trade agreements sponsored by Secretary of State Hull, while bilateral in character, have been multi-lateral in effect, their benefits being passed on to other nations under the most-favored-nation clause. Second, the need for Congressional approval would jeopardize the program, one of whose great advan-

stages was that trade negotiations had been taken out of the hands of special interest lobbies and entrusted to technical experts. True, Mr. Dewey, at his Chicago press conference of June 29, said that he hoped "the Republicans would continue to carry out the Hull trade program" which, he added, "has always been a Republican policy." The voting record does not support the latter part of Mr. Dewey's statement. The Republican members of both House and Senate voted overwhelmingly against the Hull trade program in 1934, when it was first presented to Congress; in 1937; and again in 1940. Not until 1943 did a majority of the Republicans in Congress express approval of the program.

TWO-THIRDS VOTE CLAUSE UNFORTUNATE. The emphasis on Congressional approval of reciprocal trade agreements is matched by the specific commitment in the party platform that, "pursuant to the Constitution of the United States any treaty or agreement to attain such aims [of international organization] made on behalf of the United States with any other nation or association of nations shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators concur." Not only did the Republican party thus pass up the opportunity of proposing a constitutional amendment for the ratification of treaties by a plain majority vote, as has been widely urged. It also failed to recognize that if, as former President Hoover predicts, there will be a long transition period between the cessation of hostilities and the emergence of a more or less peaceful world, many undertakings will have to be entered into by the United States which will not have the scope of an overall peace treaty and can be expeditiously undertaken only through executive agreements. If every measure this country is to take in cooperation with other nations is to be subjected to the test of a two-thirds vote in the Senate, the prospect of effective action by one of the greatest powers in the world would be decidedly dim.

What is even more disturbing, the Republican platform reveals the same tendency to apply a double standard in international affairs that has character-

ized the pronouncements and actions of both major political parties in the past. The Republicans declare—quite understandably—that they will "at all times protect the essential interests and resources of the United States." Yet they promptly take the liberty of intervening in interests regarded as essential by another nation—Britain—by laying down the law to the British as to the best method of dealing with the thorny problem of Palestine. What is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. If the United States is to insist on all the rights and prerogatives of sovereignty, it is hardly in a position to question the right of other nations to do the same—even if, on occasion, the exercise of sovereignty by other nations shocks or troubles the conscience of Americans. We should be free to criticize our allies—but we should not regard any adjustments they may, in turn, ask us to make as a derogation of our sovereignty.

The Republicans—and the Democrats too—speak much of sovereignty and envisage the international organization of the future as an association of sovereign nations. But what is sovereignty? If the people of this country should, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, decide that certain adjustments, and even sacrifices, on the part of the United States, in collaboration with other nations, will serve the interests of this country best, this would be a proper use of sovereignty. As Wendell Willkie said in his criticism of the Republican party on June 26, to use our position of leadership "for our own enrichment and that of mankind, will not be to weaken the sovereign power of the American people; it will be to widen it and make it more real."

There now seems little doubt that the thoughtful leaders of both major political parties are aware of the need for participation by the United States in some form of international organization. How to pass from words to deeds is the next task that must be faced not only by political leaders, but by the entire electorate, whose understanding and support will determine the course political leaders will feel both impelled and free to take.

VERA MICHELES DEAN.

RECALL OF ALLIED AMBASSADORS

The recall last week of American Ambassador Norman Armour from Buenos Aires for consultation in Washington, accompanied by the similar recall of the British Ambassador, Sir David Kelley, highlights the growing difficulties in relations between the United States and Argentina. This country and Britain have declined to recognize the regime of President Farrell, and have no diplomatic contacts with that regime. This situation is in striking contrast to the decision of the United States, Britain, and eighteen of the American republics to recognize,

UNDERLINES ARGENTINE CRISIS

on June 23, the government of President Villaruel in Bolivia, six months after the armed revolt that overthrew the pro-Allied government of General Peñaranda. This decision followed the ouster from the Bolivian cabinet of several of Villaruel's followers who were known to be pro-Nazi, and had been closely associated with Argentine officials before they carried out their anti-Peñaranda coup. On the basis of a report on conditions in Bolivia, prepared by Avra Warren, American Ambassador to Panama, and submitted to all governments of South and Cen-

tral American republics without recommendation, it was jointly decided to recognize the Villaruel regime at this time, without waiting for the general elections which are to be held on July 2.

Meanwhile, our political relations with Argentina are at the lowest ebb they have ever reached, although our economic ties remain close. The strict censorship enforced by the Farrell regime prevents Argentines from learning the views and policies of the United States. For example, Argentina banned President Roosevelt's statement regarding the planned transfer of small naval vessels by the United States to South American countries, as well as his statement to Congress of June 12 condemning persecution of Jewish and other minorities in Europe. It is difficult as yet to see how the existing deadlock with

Argentina will be broken. Argentina is in a favorable economic position, since it has surpluses of meat and wheat which will be needed by the liberated countries of Europe the moment hostilities are over, and apparently believes it can "sit out the war." Meanwhile, former Undersecretary of State Welles, who played an important part in the development of the Good Neighbor policy, has deplored Washington's policy toward Argentina as "the shortsighted attempt of the Department of State to utilize inter-American machinery for the purpose of coercing the Argentine Republic," adding: "There is no room for the coercion of any American state by another in the present system of inter-American understanding."

SYDNOR H. WALKER

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON RUSSIA

The Russian Army: its Men, its Leaders and its Battles, by Walter Kerr. New York, Knopf, 1944. \$2.75

A competent study of the organization and activities of the Russian Army, by a former Moscow correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*. Particularly interesting for its analysis of the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, and its description of guerrilla warfare.

The Growth of the Red Army, by D. Fedotoff White. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. \$3.75

A Russian-born expert on shipping gives a detailed and scholarly history of the development of Russia's armed might from the early days of the Bolshevik revolution to the present time, with special emphasis on recent changes wrought by industrialization and political education of the army.

Russia and Post-War Europe, by David J. Dallin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1943. \$2.75

Mr. Dallin, a Russian Socialist who lived in exile from 1911 to 1914, and again from 1921 to the present time, explores the motives and methods of the Soviet government in international affairs. Although throughout his book he takes the view that Russia has far-reaching territorial and spheres of influence objectives in Europe, he comes to the conclusion that "an alliance with the great nations of the west rather than with the multitude of small nations in eastern Europe . . . accords better with Russia's needs as well as with the national sentiments in the country."

Have the reciprocal agreements aided U.S. trade?
What effect has war had on the trade program?
READ—

RECIPROCAL TRADE PROGRAM AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

by Howard P. Whidden, Jr.

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The Siege of Leningrad, by Boris Skomorovsky and E. G. Morris. New York, Books, Inc. Distributed by E. P. Dutton & Company, 1944. \$2.50

This little book, pieced out of letters, diaries, verses, and stories written by the courageous inhabitants of Leningrad, of all ages and in different walks of life, conveys, in spite of its unevenness, a vivid feeling of the trials undergone during the German siege, and the spirit with which these trials were faced.

The Russian Enigma: An Interpretation, by William Henry Chamberlin. New York, Scribner's, 1943. \$2.75

A veteran interpreter of Russia, who never hesitates to speak his mind, summarizes the main trends of the country's development under Soviet rule, and expresses the hope that "there will emerge, out of the present ordeal of humanity, in which the Russian people have played a heroic part, a Free Russia, an integral and inseparable part of a Free World."

What Russia Wants, by Joachim Joesten. New York, World Book Company, distributed by Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. \$2.50

The author, German-born assistant editor of *Newsweek*, analyzes Russia's territorial problems with its neighbors West and East, and views their adjustment in a hopeful spirit, on the theory that "where there's a will there's a way."

Russia and the United States, by Pitirim A. Sorokin. New York, Literary Classics, distributed by E. P. Dutton and Company, 1944. \$3.00

Professor Sorokin, Russian-born chairman of the Department of Sociology at Harvard University, expresses a firm conviction that Russia and the United States will find concrete bases for collaboration in the post-war world.

Russia and the Peace, by Bernard Pares. New York, Macmillan, 1944. \$2.50

A well-known British authority on Russian history writes sympathetically, if somewhat chattily, about various aspects of Russia's domestic and foreign affairs from the vantage point of historical perspective.

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